THE MIRROR OF HUMAN NATURE.

Wherein are Exhibited

ANALYTICAL DEFINITIONS

OF THE

NATURAL AND MORAL

Faculties, Affections, and Paſſions,

WHENCE ALL ACTIONS ORIGINATE.

WITH

Maxims for the Regulation thereof.

TO WHCIH IS SUBJOINED,

A SYSTEMATICAL VIEW

OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

NOSCE TEIPSUM.

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PREFACE.

THE following pages are compiled from ſome papers received by the Editor in a correſpondence with which he was honoured by a noble Lord, lately deceaſed; and they are now made public, from a perſuaſion that every peruſer will be much aſſiſted by them in the regulation of his ideas and conduct.

POPE's doctrine, that

"The proper ſtudy of mankind is man,"

is highly intereſting and worthy of regard. The nature of man is eſſentially twofold, corporeal and ſpiritual or intellectual, fraught with many faculties, affections, and paſſions. The various conſtituent parts of his corporeal ſyſtem have been, by the ingenuity of modern times, accurately inveſtigated, and diſtinctly defined; but the analyſis of his ſpiritual or intellectual ſyſtem (whether from the inability, indigeſtion, or redundancy of writers) is yet enveloped in much obſcurity and confuſion. No endeavours, therefore, have been wanting to render this inveſtigation at once conciſe and clear; in which reſpects, at leaſt, it has doubtleſs the advantage of all former ſimilar attempts. In ſhort, this publication is deſigned to be, in reſpect to the mind, what anatomy and medicine are in reſpect to the body; that the prejudices and errors

rors of the firſt may be diſcovered and corrected by means of the one, as the irregularities and diſorders of the laſt are aſcertained and remedied by means of the others.

The late Earl of Cheſterfield, in his Letters to his Son, not long ſince publiſhed, has, even to a degree of ridiculous hyperbole, inculcated the ſtudy and acquiſition of perſonal accompliſhments: the *Graces*, the *Graces* (of the body), are his continual theſis, whilſt the infinitely more valuable graces of the mind, as if beneath *his own* care, are profeſſedly committed to that of another perſon. But (happily) the candid part of the world, unwarped by the influence of politics, are ſenſible of the error; and it is no ſmall pleaſure to the Editor, thus publicly to teſtify, in honour of his late noble patron, that he *preferred* the beauties and embelliſhments of the mind to all perſonal endowments and *graces* whatſoever.

May this principle more and more prevail! and the preſent little compilation, in ſome meaſure, counteract the looſe, noxious ſentiments interſperſed throughout the voluminous publication above-mentioned!

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THE EDITOR.

THE MIRROR OF HUMAN NATURE.

CHAP. I.

DEFINITIONS *of the* NATURAL *and* MORAL FACULTIES; *with the* AFFECTIONS *and* PASSIONS.

THE FACULTIES.

THE *Soul* of Man is that particle of his nature which is *ſpiritual* or IMMORTAL; and, when conſidered in reſpect to its *animation* of the *body*, is denominated SPIRIT; and, when in reſpect to its *intellectual powers*, MIND. Theſe powers are, ſometimes, in alluſion to the various organs or parts in which bodily motion and ſenſation have their origin, called the *faculties* of the *head* and *heart*, the former of which are natural, the latter moral. In the following pages we have attempted an analyſis of them.*

* The paragraphs (in this chapter) immediately following the head-lines diſtinguiſhed by numerals, exhibit the definitions of the primary faculties, &c. from which flow the inferior, as defined in the paragraphs marked with figures.

I. INSTINCT.

That internal and innate principle of action, common to man with inferior animals, by which he is naturally incited or impelled to whatever is neceſſary for his preſervation and ſupport, without waiting the deliberate operations of *Reaſon*, is called INSTINCT.

1. The natural propenſities we have, in common with inferior animals, towards ſuch objects as are neceſſary for the ſupport and nouriſhment of the body, are called *Appetites*.

II. SENSES.

The ſenſible Powers, *i. e.* thoſe by which we receive any ſenſations or impreſſions independently of the will, are called SENSES.

1. Thoſe by which we receive impreſſions from external objects are called the *five External Senſes* of ſeeing, &c. Thoſe by which we receive ſuch impreſſions, alſo, from internal objects, independently of the will, are called *Internal Senſes*, viz. the public ſenſe, the moral ſenſe, and the ſenſe of honour.

III. IMAGINATION.

The power of connecting or aſſociating ideas, (whether they are ſo connected by nature

nature or not), and forming images or pictures of their objects in this united view, ſo as to repreſent or bring them nearer to the mind (however ſeemingly diſtant), is called IMAGINATION; and the mind's perſuaſion of the reality of their union or connection is called *Opinion*.

1. The joint exerciſe of the Underſtanding and Imagination, exploring the region of poſſibilities, and collecting materials for accompliſhing or facilitating ſome end, otherwiſe unattainable, is called *Invention*, and the proſecution of ſuch diſcoveries, *Improvement*.

2. A quick perception rather of the fanciful than real relations of objects, with ſuch an aſſemblage and repreſentation of them as will beſt communicate the perception or impreſſion we have to others, is called *Wit*.

3. A ſuperior capacity and diſpoſition for this, ariſing from nature rather than culture, and peculiarly adapted to ſome particular objects or ſtudies, is called *Genius*.

4. A nice and quick perception of the qualities that conſtitute any particular ſpecies of beauty or propriety in objects, and a conſequent reliſh for them, is called *Taſte*; but too frequent a change of this, or of the objects it has reſpect to, eſpe-

cially when fanciful and not real, is *Whim* or *Caprice*.

IV. MEMORY.

The power of recording, retaining, and recollecting paſt perceptions and impreſſions, is called MEMORY. The joint exerciſe of the Underſtanding and Memory, in aſſembling and ſurveying internal objects or ideas, is called *Reflection*. [*See the ſubjoined view of* KNOWLEDGE.]

V. REASON.

The mental faculties in general, by which man is diſtinguiſhed from inferior animals, and fitted to diſcover, reliſh, and purſue a higher good, goes by the name of REASON; this, as it reſpects particularly the power of diſcovering truth, and diſtinguiſhing it from the contrary, is UNDERSTANDING.

1. The exerciſe of the Underſtanding, determining as to the qualities of different actions or objects, after comparing and diſtinguiſhing them according to their diſcovered nature and tendency, is called *Judgment*.

2. This, when applied to our own actions and diſpoſitions, by paſſing judgment upon them as right or wrong, the objects of approbation, or diſapprobation, is called *Conſcience*.

3. In

3. In the proper exercise of this, discerning the propriety of actions and characters, distinguishing and preferring them accordingly, consists *Prudence*; and the joint exercise or co-operation of all our faculties, in pursuing the best ends by the best means, constitutes true *Wisdom*.

4. This, when applied to the common affairs of life, and when supposing only a common share of intellect, aided by experience, rather than much culture or refinement, is called *Sagacity* or *Common Sense*.

5. A proper regard to Conscience in our intercourse with others, according to their various relations, and the laws and duties arising from thence, constitutes the cardinal virtue of Justice, in all its different forms of *Equity*, *Honesty*, &c. A regard to character rather than conscience or law, is called *Honour*.

VI. WILL.

The power of chusing or refusing, according to the discovered nature and tendency of objects, is called the WILL. The various modifications of the Will, in pursuing good and avoiding evil, are, when calm and sedate, called *Affections*, and, when some animal emotions or perturbations accompany them, *Passions*. By repeated acts or long indulgence of these, they grow into *Habits*; their habitual prevalence, or

particular combinations of ſuch habits, form particular *Tempers* and *Diſpoſitions*, by which the *Conduct* is regulated; and the general tenor of a man's temper and conduct fixes his *Character*.

VII. SELF-PRESERVATION.

Of all the modifications of the Will, the moſt univerſal and inſeparable from the ſoul, and that from which the reſt, however numerous or various, take their origin, is the principle of SELF-PRESERVATION, natural to all living, but more eſpecially to all rational creatures; in the former it is governed only by *Inſtinct*, in the latter likewiſe by *Reaſon*. The miniſters, or rather auxiliaries, of Reaſon, are the *Affections* and *Paſſions*, the force of which is increaſed as the propenſities of Inſtinct co-operate in purſuing good and avoiding evil. The ſimpleſt motions of the mind towards theſe, are,

VIII. APPROBATION.

When, in the object of our perception, we find any congruity to our ideas of excellence, natural or moral, ſo as to communicate pleaſure, it is reckoned good, and raiſes APPROBATION.

1. When regard is had partly to the excellency, but more to the uncommonneſs of the object, there is a pauſe of reaſon by *Admiration*;

Admiration; and when regard is had only to the uncommonneſs or ſingularity of the object, and no other quality, it is beheld with *Wonder*.

2. An inclination to be more fully acquainted with the object we perceive or admire, is called *Curioſity*; if it appears ſuddenly or unexpectedly, it raiſes *Surprize*, which riſing high, is *Amazement* or *Aſtoniſhment*.

3. When regard is had to the value or excellency of the object we approve, either intellectual or moral, yet without any inclination or propenſity towards it, it raiſes *Eſteem*; which is either of *Ourſelves* or *Others*.

OTHERS.

i. When the object carries in it an idea of greatneſs and dignity with ſuperiority, it commands *Awe* and *Reverence*. When it has any thing in it ſublime, ſolemn, or ſacred, it raiſes *Veneration*; and when this has GOD for its object, and is accompanied with acts expreſſive of it, it is *Worſhip* or *Adoration*.

ii. A proper degree of eſteem and good-will to others, regulating our deportment to them according to their various conditions and relations, is called *Civility*, *Complaiſance*, or *Courteſy*, as modes of *Politeneſs*; and when the object is ſuperior to us, we regard it with *Deference*, *Reſpect*, and *Honour*.

OUR-

OURSELVES.

i. A juſt ſenſe of our own errors, follies, and weakneſſes, diſpoſing us to bear with thoſe of others, is called *Humility*.

ii. Generoſity and humility, or a juſt ſenſe both of our worth and our weakneſs, not affected nor altered by outward circumſtances or opinions, produce that equal temper of mind called *Equanimity*.

iii. A noble elevation of mind, ariſing from a juſt eſteem of ourſelves, and ſenſe of our ſuperiority to others, diſpoſing us to do the more good to them, without any view to a return, is called *Generoſity*.

iv. When this reaſonable ſelf-eſteem is accompanied with a contempt of danger, and diſpoſition for enterprize or great exploits, together with a noble independence of mind, it takes the name of *Magnanimity*.

v. When our eſteem of ourſelves, or opinion of our own rank and merit, is ſo high as to leſſen the regard due to thoſe of others, it is called *Pride*, which is increaſed by whatever increaſes this ſelf-eſteem, as *Obſequiouſneſs*, *Flattery*, *Praiſe*, *&c.*

vi. A vain diſplay of any imaginary merit or diſtinction of our own, in order to gain the attention and regard of others, is *Oſtentation*, and when this diſplay is made in imitation of others, as to qualities not material to us nor poſſeſſed by us, it is *Affectation*.

vii. Such

vii. Such an opinion of our own abilities and attainments as makes us regardleſs of the advice and opinion of others, is called *Self-ſufficiency* or *Conceit*; which, when accompanied with a perſuaſion that others have a high opinion of our merit, is *Vanity*.

viii. When Pride leads us to claim any right or diſtinction that is not due to us, it takes the name of *Arrogance*; a diſplay of which by outward expreſſions of diſreſpect or contempt in our carriage towards others is called *Haughtineſs* or *Inſolence*.

IX. DISAPPROBATION.

When the object we perceive is incongruous or diſagreeable to theſe ideas, ſo as to communicate pain, it is reckoned evil, and raiſes DISAPPROBATION.

1. When the object is conſidered as worthleſs or of no value, either in an intellectual or moral ſenſe, yet not ſuch as to merit hatred or averſion, it raiſes *Diſeſteem*, which is either of *Ourſelves* or of *Others*.

OTHERS.

i. Diſeſteem of others, carried too far, has the ſame effect as too high an eſteem of ourſelves in producing *Pride*; and when this is accompanied with an opinion of their inſignificancy or inferiority to us, we regard them with *Contempt*.

ii. Contempt

ii. Contempt rising high, with such expressions of it as may expose to the contempt of others, is called *Derision*, or *Ridicule*; and when the object of our contempt is reckoned far beneath us, it is considered with *Scorn* or *Disdain*.

OURSELVES.

i. Disesteem of ourselves, from an insensibility of our real merit, or the distinction due to us, and over-rating that of others, occasions *Diffidence*.

ii. When this is attended with so low an opinion of our own abilities as may prevent our undertaking or executing what we are capable of, it induces a certain weakness or feebleness of mind called *Pusillanimity*.

iii. When this makes us yield to the undue influence of others, by an implicit, yet voluntary compliance with them, even against our own experience or judgment, it is called *Simplicity*; and a facility hence arising in our assent to the testimony or reliance on the veracity of others, is *Credulity*.

iv. Pusillanimity often following on Pride, and leading to low submissions and artifices, especially if for low ends, is called *Meanness* or *Abjectness*.

AFFEC-

AFFECTIONS AND PASSIONS.

X. LOVE.

When by contemplation of the object, or reflection on its agreeable qualities, our approbation of it is attended with a ſenſation of pleaſure, and ſome inclination or propenſity towards it as good, it is called LOVE.

1. When we ourſelves are the ultimate objects of our Love or regard, it is called *Self-love*; which, when accompanied with certain inordinate propenſities towards outward objects, takes the different forms and names here mentioned:

2. Self-love engaging to the immoderate deſire and purſuit of fame or diſtinction, by equalling or excelling others, is called *Emulation*.

3. Self-love engaging to the immoderate deſire of any object poſſeſſed by another, is called *Covetouſneſs*, or (when wealth is the object) *Avarice*; and, according to the value that appears to be put upon outward goods, our diſtribution of, or affection towards them, is called *Penury*, *Frugality*, or *Profuſion*.

4. Self-love engaging to the immoderate deſire and purſuit of power and authority, is called *Ambition*; and ~~infatiable~~ Ambition, when armed with abſolute power, without goodneſs, is *Tyranny*.

5. Self-

5. Self-love determining to the immoderate desire and pursuit of sensual pleasure, or whatever gratifies only the outward senses and appetites, is called *Voluptuousness* or *Sensuality*; which takes the different forms and names of *Gluttony*, *Debauchery*, *Luxury*, *Dissoluteness*, &c.

6. Self-love engaging to the pursuit of ease or rest is called *Indolence*; which, when immoderately indulged, so as to induce a certain debility or vacuity of thought, is called *Sluggishness* or *Sloth*.

7. When others are the ultimate objects of it, without regard to their moral qualities, or relation to us, but only their partaking the same common nature with us, and capacity of receiving good from us, Love has the general name of *Benevolence*.

8. If this arises from a natural or habitual disposition of pleasing, or communicating good to others, it is called *Universal Good-Will*, or *Good-Nature*; the display of this to inferiors or dependants, is *Humanity*; and when without regard to their indigence or requital, it is *Beneficence* or *Liberality*.

9. Benevolence to our benefactors, is *Gratitude*; the expressions of it, *Thankfulness* and *Praise*.

10. Benevolence to the injurious, when needing our assistance, is called *Mercy*, *Forgiveness*, or *Clemency*; and, if it hinders our

our returning injuries when in our power, *Lenity*, *Forbearance*, or *Meekneſs*.

11. Benevolence to the afflicted, is *Pity* or *Compaſſion*; when to this is joined a fellow-feeling of their diſtreſs, ariſing either from ſimilar experience or from natural humanity and *Tenderneſs* of heart, it is called *Sympathy*; and if theſe diſpoſe us to favour or relieve them, without hopes of a return, *Charity*.

12. When regard is had to their moral qualities, relation to us, and fitneſs to pleaſe or do us good, Love ſettles into *Complacence*.

13. A natural or habitual complacency of diſpoſition, engaging to aſſociate with others in general, is called *Sociableneſs*; mutual complacence, intimacy, and equality, together with a conformity of diſpoſitions, virtuous principles and purſuits, conſtitute that happy union of minds called true *Friendſhip*.

14. An attachment to particular ſects, factions, or opinions, to the prejudice of true piety or patriotiſm, is *Narrowneſs of Spirit*, or *Bigotry*; but when this attachment is regulated by reaſon and benevolence, it is called *Moderation*.

15. Complacence in a ſmall degree is expreſſed by *Satisfaction*, in a higher degree by *Delight*; and when regard is had not ſo much to the qualities of the object,

as its relation to us, it is called *Kindneſs* or *Tenderneſs*; the want of which, where due, is *Unkindneſs*.

16. When the objects of our love and complacence are ſuch as ſtand in any natural relation to us, it is called *Natural Affection*; and when our native country and its intereſts are the objects of it, it is called *Patriotiſm*.

17. When GOD is the object, an habitual deſire of pleaſing him, with a diſengagement from whatever may leſſen our regard and affection towards him, is called *Devotion*; which, mixt with a filial and reverential fear of offending him, is *Godlineſs* or *Piety*.

18. Zeal for any particular parties or opinions, ariſing from an apprehenſion of ſupernatural influence and incitements to it, and accompanied with an uncommon energy of ſpirit and elevation of fancy and affection, is called *Enthuſiaſm*.

19. An uncommon vehemence of temper appearing in our attachment to particular parties or opinions of any kind, and engaging us earneſtly to propagate or defend them, and to oppoſe or ſuppreſs the contrary, is called *Zeal*.

XI. HATRED.

When by frequent reflection on its diſagreeable qualities, our diſapprobation of it

it is attended with a diſinclination of mind towards it, it is called HATRED; its different forms, from diſappointing or counteracting the ſelfiſh or public affections, have no diſtinct names.

1. Evil received or dreaded, raiſes *Malevolence*; an habitual malevolence, or diſpoſition to diſpleaſe others, is *Ill-Will*, or *Ill-Nature*; this long continued towards any, and unmerited, is *Malignity* or *Malice*.

2. Any degree of malevolence to our benefactors, or even neglect and undue returns to them, is *Ingratitude*. A malevolent oppoſition to governors or ſuperiors in the lawful exerciſe of their authority, is *Rebellion*; and ſuch an oppoſition to the will of God, or contempt of what relates to him, is *Impiety*.

3. Malevolence to the miſerable, is *Inhumanity*; unwillingneſs to favour or relieve them, is *Uncharitableneſs*; which, with inſenſibility, or inattention to their diſtreſs, is *Hard-Heartedneſs*; add inſolence to any of theſe, and it becomes *Barbarity* or *Cruelty*.

4. A wanton cruelty to others, without benefit to ourſelves, is *Petulance*; which, when the characters, rather than the perſons of others, are attacked, is called *Obloquy*, *Reproach*, and *Scurrility*; this, when ſoftened by ſome mixture of wit and humour, is *Raillery*, and *Invective*.

5. Evil or injury received, though not further dreaded, raiſes *Diſpleaſure*, or *Diſplacency*; the ſmalleſt degree of which is called *Diſlike*.

6. When hatred is pointed at every thing criminal, without regard to what may extenuate, it is called *Harſhneſs* or *Severity*; and when at innocent pleaſures or liberties, without making proper allowances for them, *Moroſeneſs*.

7. When hatred or diſpleaſure riſes high on a ſudden, from an apprehenſion of injury received, and perturbation of mind in conſequence of it, it is called *Anger*; the firſt workings of it, *Animoſity*; and its effects, *Outrage*.

8. An injury from an inferior is termed an *Indignity*; and the ſenſe of it, *Indignation*; our ſenſe of any injury, *Reſentment*; which, with a propenſity to injure the offender, without deſire of reclaiming him, is *Revenge*; this, when ſettled into a habit, and refuſing reconciliation, is *Spite* and *Rancour*.

9. An habitual proneneſs to anger, on every little occaſion, is called *Fretfulneſs* or *Peeviſhneſs*; this, when ſilent, is *Sullenneſs*; when talkative, *Snarling*; and when there is added to it an impatience of contradiction to ourſelves, and deſire of contradicting others, it is *Frowardneſs* or *Perverſeneſs*.

10. Anger, riſing to a very high degree, and extinguiſhing humanity, becomes *Fierceneſs*;

Fierceneſs; a ſudden and immoderate tranſport of anger, is *Wrath*, *Rage*, and *Fury*.

XII. DESIRE.

When our approbation and love of any object are accompanied with uneaſineſs in its abſence, and pleaſure from the apprehenſion of its approach or attainableneſs, our affection towards it is called DESIRE.

1. Deſire, inflamed and continued, is called *Longing*; when much whetted, in view of ſeizing its object, *Greedineſs*, or *Avidity*; and when accompanied with much emotion and eagerneſs, without the deliberation of reaſon, it is called *Propenſity*.

2. Deſires after what reſpects the ſupport of the body, are called *Appetites*; in a proper reſtraint or moderation of theſe conſiſts the cardinal virtue of *Temperance*.

3. When regard is not had to the nature and qualities of the object, ſo much as to its relation or agreeableneſs to us, we are ſaid to regard it with *Partiality*.

4. A weak motion or tendency of the mind towards the object deſired, is called *Inclination*; this, when violent, and ſuch as cannot be rationally accounted for, is called *Impulſe*.

XIII. AVERSION.

When our diſapprobation and hatred of any object are accompanied with a painful

ſenſation upon the apprehenſion of its preſence or approach, there follows an inclination to avoid it, called AVERSION.

1. Averſion in its weakeſt degree, or rather the abſence of deſire, is called *Indifference*; averſion to any object before examination, or without rational grounds for it, is *Prejudice*; and when it ariſes from previous experience of its diſagreeable qualities, it is *Diſguſt*.

2. Averſion to any object, when we are conſtrained to chooſe or comply with it, is called *Reluctance*; a conſtitutional averſion, immediately upon the perception or apprehenſion of it, without regard to its qualities or impreſſion on others, is called a *natural Antipathy*.

3. When diſpleaſure and averſion riſe very high, eſpecially upon an apprehenſion of moral evil in the object, it is called *Deteſtation*, or *Abhorrence*; and when accompanied with fears of the ſmalleſt approaches to it, *Horror*.

XIV. HOPE

A mixture of deſire and joy agitating the mind, according to the probability there is of accompliſhing the end, or obtaining the good deſired, is called HOPE.

1. Weak or diſtant hope waiting the ſucceſs of means, is called *Expectation*; the ſteady maintenance of hope, even in this

this ſtate, when attainment is protracted, and ſufferings are in the way to it, forms the virtuous habit of *Patience*; as devout acquieſcence, when deprived or diſappointed, is *Reſignation*.

2. Hope deliberating about the choice of means for obtaining the deſired object, is *Heſitation*; hope wavering or fluctuating in or after the uſe of theſe means, is called *Suſpence*.

3. Deſire, eſpecially when mixed with hope, leads us to *Wiſh*; but while we have more of deſire than hope, or even while, by a ſuſpence of judgment and opinion as to any objects of inquiry, the aſſent of the mind is delayed and unſettled, we are ſaid to *Doubt*.

4. When doubting and ſuſpence become habitual, eſpecially in matters of faith, there follows a kind of vibration or uncertainty of judgment and opinion, called *Scepticiſm*.

5. When ſuſpence is overcome, and the means fixed, we come to ſteadineſs and *Reſolution*; this perſiſted in, ~~eſpecially~~ when the grounds of it are inſufficient, is *Obſtinacy*, or *Stubbornneſs*; ſtubbornneſs in matters of opinion is called *Dogmatiſm*.

6. Contempt of danger, in the execution of what is reſolved upon, is called *Intrepidity*, *Boldneſs*, or *Courage*; a diſplay of this in warlike atchievements, *Bravery* or *Valour*;

Valour; and an impatient encountering of danger, rather than waiting the uſe of probable means for averting it, *Precipitation* or *Raſhneſs*.

7. That ſtrength or vigour of mind which appears in a diſplay of courage, firmneſs, and reſolution, when much oppoſition is to be reſiſted, diſtreſſes ſupported, difficulties and dangers ſurmounted, for the attainment of great and valuable ends, conſtitutes the cardinal virtue of *Fortitude*.

8. Hope, elated from ſecurity of ſucceſs in obtaining its object, is called *Confidence*; but groundleſs confidence, or ſecurity of the end, without the uſe of proper means, is *Preſumption*.

9. Confidence, without modeſty, or a ſecurity of obtaining any end, without regard to decency and propriety in the means, is called *Impudence*.

10. Self-confidence, accompanied with a pleaſing apprehenſion of ſelf-importance, are eſſential ingredients of *Vanity*; and a ſecurity hence ariſing of approbation and ſucceſs, whether groundleſs or not, gives *Aſſurance*.

XV. FEAR.

A mixture of averſion and ſorrow, diſcompoſing and debilitating the mind, upon the

the approach or anticipation of evil, is called FEAR.

1. An over-active fear of any event, mixed with perplexity, ſuſpence, and frequent alarms, about every minute circumſtance relating to it, is called *Solicitude* or *Anxiety*; which, when immoderately indulged, and the event protracted, grows into *Impatience*.

2. Fear of another's endeavouring ſecretly to prevent our attainment of the good deſired, raiſes our *Suſpicion*; and ſuſpicion of his having obtained, or being likely to obtain it himſelf, our *Jealouſy*.

3. When the probability of the object's approach that is dreaded comes to be increaſed, the mind gives way to *Deſpondency*; and when all hopes of averting it are extinguiſhed, it ſinks into *Deſpair*.

4. Fear, mixed with humility, fluctuating in the choice of means, and preventing the neceſſary reliance on them when uſed, is called *Irreſolution* and *Diffidence*; when this prevents action and uſe of means, as unavailable, it grows into *Dejection* of *Spirit*.

5. Diffidence of ourſelves, accompanied with much delicacy in our ſenſe of whatever is mean, indecent, or diſhonourable, and fear of its being done by, or imputed to us, is called *Modeſty*.

6. Con-

6. Conſciouſneſs of any ſuch thing's being done by, or imputed to, ourſelves, or thoſe we are concerned for, occaſions *Shame*; and an habitual apprehenſion of incurring this, ariſing from an exceſs of delicacy, and conſequent diſcompoſure, is called *Baſhfulneſs*.

7. Fear, flying from danger, rather than encountering, and by the uſe of proper means averting it, is *Cowardice*; habitual fear of ſomething awful, is called *Dread*; a ſudden and unaccountable fit of fear, a *Fright* or *Panic*; which, when exceſſive, grows into *Terror*.

XVI. JOY.

A pleaſing elation of mind, on the actual or aſſured attainment of good, or deliverance from evil, is called JOY, which is either *Natural* or *Moral*.

NATURAL.

1. Joy, on account of good obtained by others, is expreſſed by *Congratulation*; and when it ariſes occaſionally from ludicrous or fugitive amuſements, in which others ſhare with us, it is called *Merriment* or *Mirth*.

2. Joy ariſing from a conqueſt over ſome conſiderable oppoſition, is called *Triumph*; and when accompanied with much oſtentation, *Vain-Glory*.

3. When

3. When joy is ſettled into a habit, or flows from a placid temper of mind, formed to pleaſe, and be pleaſed, it is called *Gaiety*, *Good-Humour*, or *Chearfulneſs*.

4. Joy, riſing high on a ſudden, is *Exultation*; and immoderate tranſports of it, raviſhing the ſoul and raiſing it as it were above itſelf, are called *Raptures*, or *Ecſtaſies*.

MORAL.

1. Well-grounded ſelf-approbation, from a conſciouſneſs of our temper and conduct being regulated aright, with reſpect to God and man, is the foundation of true *Moral Joy*, inward *Peace* and *Serenity* of *Mind*.

2. When this riſes high, and is accompanied with a lively ſenſe of the divine favour and approbation, it gives a fore-taſte of the celeſtial felicity, which is expreſſed by *Glory*.

3. Habitual joy and ſerenity, ariſing from the perfection, rectitude, and due ſubordination of our faculties, and their lively exerciſe on objects agreeable to them, conſtitute mental or rational *Happineſs*.

XVII. SORROW.

A painful depreſſion of ſpirit, upon the deprivation of good, or the anticipation or arrival of evil, is called SORROW, which is either *Natural* or *Moral*.

NATURAL;

NATURAL.

1. Sorrow increaſed and continued is called *Grief*; when toſſed by hopes and fears, it is *Diſtraction*; and when theſe are ſwallowed up by it, *Deſpair*; the higheſt degrees, or rather ſenſations, of natural ſorrow, are called *Agonies*.

2. Grief, when ſilent and thoughtful, ſettles into *Penſiveneſs* or *Sadneſs*; and when long indulged, ſo as to prey upon and poſſeſs the mind, it becomes habitual, and grows into *Melancholy*.

3. Sorrow in its loweſt degree is called *Concern*; and when it ariſes from the diſappointment of our hopes and endeavours, *Vexation*.

MORAL.

1. Sorrow on account of actions or events which might (in our opinion) have been prevented, is called *Regret*; fruitleſs and inactive complaints of them, *Murmuring* or *Repining*; a change of temper and conduct, *Repentance*; and the humility and ſorrow accompanying this, *Contrition*.

2. When it ariſes from a painful remembrance of criminal actions and purſuits, and is accompanied with ſelf-condemnation and compunction of mind on account of them, it is called *Remorſe*.

3. When unavailing remorſe riſes high, it anticipates the infernal miſeries, and is called *Anguiſh*.

4. Sorrow,

4. Sorrow, ariſing from the unmerited ſufferings of others, is expreſſed by *Commiſeration* and *Condolence*; our ſenſe of theſe ſufferings, by *Sympathy* or *Compaſſion*; and our endeavours to ſooth, or alleviate them, by *Conſolation*.

5. When our ſorrow ariſes from the happineſs of others enjoying a good which we deſire, and think we deſerve, or when we rejoice on their loſing it, it is called *Envy*; when this leads us to rival their merit, by leſſening it, rather than by raiſing our own, it is called *Defamation* and *Detraction*.

CHAP. II.

OUTWARD INDICATIONS OR EXPRESSIONS OF THE PLEASING AFFECTIONS.

JOY may ariſe not only from what is *preſent*, but alſo from what is *paſt* or *expected*: Good foreſeen raiſes the joy of hope, and to recollect former joys gives ſome pleaſure from the thoughts of our having once poſſeſſed them, mingled with pain for their being gone.

Joy appears in a vivacity of ſpirit, a ſparkling eye, a florid ſmiling countenance, a raiſed aſpect, a pleaſant freedom of ſpeech, ſinging, ſhouting, exulting, and leaping for gladneſs. *Joy* and *Love* join upon ſome tender occaſions, and produce *Tears*.

Moral Joy is expreſſed by a ſerene and peaceful countenance; a calm pleaſure on the face, an univerſal eaſe.

HOPE ſhews itſelf by an eager ſtretching out of the arms to receive the good deſired, by an intent fixing of the eyes upon the perſon from whom we expect it, by breathing and panting, a chearful countenance, earneſt wiſhes, and impatience of poſſeſſion.

Deſire,

Deſire, *Hope*, and *Joy*, extend not only to what is *good*, but likewiſe to what is *advantageous*, or conducive to procure it.

DELIGHT expreſſes itſelf in various ways; we gaze upon a pleaſing figure or picture, liſten to muſic or diſcourſe, ſmell to flowers, are intent upon delightful ſtudies, &c.

FONDNESS appears in a thouſand nameleſs airs and expreſſions of kindneſs and tenderneſs, which nature teaches us to underſtand. Parents love children with fondneſs and benevolence; children love parents with fondneſs and veneration; huſbands and wives mix fondneſs and friendſhip.

GRATITUDE properly reſpects intelligent beings, and is made up of complacence and benevolence on occaſion of good received from another; it is a gentle principle, makes little commotion in our frame, except a ſenſible pleaſure when our benefactor is happy, contriving and endeavouring to make him ſo.

BENEVOLENCE diſcovers itſelf in a pleaſing countenance, a ſoft and ſmiling air, affability of ſpeech, gentleneſs of behaviour, and readineſs to relieve the oppreſſed and the miſerable.

FRIENDSHIP unites itſelf to the object, produces a communion of benefits and communication of good offices, and delights in the company, converſe, and remembrance of the object.

HONOUR and Reſpect are ſhewn by expreſſions of ſubjection, mixed with love and a deſire to pleaſe.

ADORATION has GOD *alone* for its object, and requires the mentioning his name always with awe and reverence, bowing the knee before him, prayer, praiſe, and every outward act of devotion, with a quick reſentment of any diſhonour done him.

VENERATION of any man appears in a humble and reſpectful behaviour before him, imitating his excellencies, and reſenting any injury offered him.

ADMIRATION ſhews itſelf by lifting up the hands or eyes, by an intenſe fixing of the ſight, by ſtopping the voice, by fixing the perſon for a time like a ſtatue. Young and ignorant people are moſt liable to admiration, as well as *Curioſity*; which is a promiſing mark of improvement, if it does not deſcend to things mean and trivial.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

OUTWARD INDICATIONS OR EXPRESSIONS OF THE PAINFUL PASSIONS.

SORROW may ariſe, not only from *preſent*, but from *paſt* or *future* evils. Evil foreſeen raiſes ſorrow mixed with fear; and remembrance of former ſorrow has bitterneſs and joy.

Sorrow is attended with heavy eye-lids, paleneſs of the cheeks and lips, affecting ſolitude, tears, averſion to buſineſs, indifference to pleaſure, neglect of food and dreſs, &c.

ENVY is joy or ſorrow mixed with malice; it wears a ſour and uneaſy countenance, has ſometimes a malignant ſmile, with ſpiteful anger, and perhaps biting jeſts; it waſtes life, and deſtroys the comforts of it.

Moral Sorrow vents itſelf in ſighs and tears, in tearing the hair and beating the breaſt, with hollowneſs of the eyes, ſelf-loathing, ſelf-curſing, and ſometimes ſelf-murder.

MODESTY appears in bluſhes, and is the guard and ſymptom of innocence.

DIFFIDENCE appears in bluſhing, paleneſs, and trembling, confuſion of thought,

ſtopping of the voice, and heſitation of ſpeech.

FEAR appears in paleneſs of the face, ſinking of the ſpirits, trembling of the voice and limbs, fainting, chilneſs, ſpeedy flight.

JEALOUSY is accompanied with a perpetual uneaſy watchfulneſs, ill-will to the object of it, uncharitable thoughts, and miſconſtruction of his words and actions.

IMPATIENCE, eſpecially when mixed with ſuſpence, about events of importance, appears in an unſettled look, reſtleſſneſs, walking (as Salluſt informs of Catiline) ſometimes faſt and ſometimes ſlow.

DESPAIR refuſes all comfort, is deaf to all advice, neglects all means of relief, often abandons to vice, and ſometimes ends in ſelf-murder.

ABHORRENCE is ſeen in diſtortion of the countenance, ſhutting the eyes, ſtopping the ears, turning away the face, leaving the company.

ANTIPATHY often occaſions ſweating, paleneſs, trembling, and fainting.

ANGER ſometimes looks pale and wan, but generally rather red and fiery, flames in the eyes, knits or wrinkles the brows, enlarges and heaves the noſtrils, ferments the blood, inflames the ſpirits, ſwells the body, and ſets it in motion towards revenge; in ſome it is ſudden and vehement,

appears

appears and perhaps diſappears in a moment, fluſhes in the face, ſparkles or guſhes in the eye, ſtamps with the foot, clinches the fiſt, awakens the tongue, &c. This may be the caſe with perſons who have much love and goodneſs in their tempers, and with whom it is ſoon over. In others its effects are not ſo rapid; it is ſilent and ſullen, goes from day to day with a gloomy aſpect and ſour carriage, and is averſe to ſpeak to the offender, except in ſuch words as are ſpiteful.

MALEVOLENCE appears in a frowning or louring countenance, uncharitableneſs, evil ſentiments, hard ſpeeches, curſing, reviling.

CONTEMPT ſhews itſelf by turning the back, ſhrinking up the noſe, thruſting out the lip, deriſion, laughter, &c.

ABJECTNESS appears in awkwardneſs of behaviour, unreaſonable baſhfulneſs, ſheepiſh and downcaſt looks, unmanly carriage.

PRIDE is diſcovered by an affected mien or air, a toſs of the head, a lofty look, dwelling at a looking-glaſs, talking much of one's ſelf and family, ſpeaking to equals ſcornfully, and treating inferiors contemptuouſly.

The *Vain Man* thinks others have a high opinion of him. The Proud has it of himſelf. This makes him in *Proſperity* neglect all culture, friendſhip, and improvement; for

† This is a curious ſpecies of Pride I believe it is more frequently one of vanity

for want of which, in *Adverſity*, he has recourſe to low arts for ſupport, and ſinks into *Abjectneſs*. Thus (ſays Swift) Men climb in the ſame poſture that they creep. *Affectation* differs from *Hypocriſy*, in that the latter is a falſe ſhow of *Qualities proper* for us to have, and the former of ſuch as are either *improper* or *indifferent*: When this has reſpect to *Learning*, it is called *Pedantry*; and when to outward *Ornaments*, or *Accompliſhments*, it diſtinguiſhes the characters of *Coxcombs* and *Coquettes*.

Thus much with reſpect to the outward *Indications* of the *Paſſions*.—As to the *Rationale* of all theſe, or the commotions of the *Nerves*, and ferments of the blood and ſpirits, which are either the *Cauſes* or *Effects* of them, according as the *Mind* or *Body* is firſt operated upon, it is a ſubject of *phyſical* rather than of *moral* inquiry.—Deſcartes has exerciſed his ingenuity upon it; and Dr. White, of Edinburgh, in his excellent treatiſe on nervous diſorders, has given all the account of it that can be expected, which, however *ſolid*, he does not pretend to be *ſatisfying*.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

MAXIMS FOR REGULATING THE NATURAL FACULTIES, viz.

UNDERSTANDING, IMAGINATION, MEMORY, &c.

I. THE particular province of the UNDERSTANDING is the diſcovery of *Truth*, and the proper conduct of it, in order to this, may be reduced to the following Rules:

1. Be ready to receive information from every man, but think and judge for yourſelf. Be alſo ready to give information to others.

2. Wiſh not any opinion to be true, till you find it to be ſo; and when you do, let your opinion be ſteady, and be ready to ſupport it.

3. Endeavour to underſtand your own buſineſs or calling, whatever it is, and to *reaſon* aright with reſpect to it.

4. Let not your *Judgment* be determined by your *Paſſion*, *Intereſt*, *Prejudice*, *&c.* nor by the *Character* and *Reputation* of others, for theſe cannot alter the *Nature* of things, which ſhould always be conſulted.

5. Let

5. Let not your *Opinion* be fixed without a *Foundation* for it, nor your *Aſſent go beyond your Evidence*. But refuſe not aſſent where due.

6. Beware of miſtaking *Words* for *Ideas*, knowlege being only a perception of the relation of your own ideas, and not the words or ideas of others.

7. Let not your underſtanding be fettered by *One Set of Thoughts*, nor diſtracted by *many*, but free to turn itſelf to any object, and give it the attention neceſſary, with a view to your main purpoſe, and no more.

8. Conſider the nature and manner of proof any queſtion is capable of, and take not up your time and thoughts with any other.

9. Approach the moſt difficult parts of knowledge by *Degrees*, but deſpair not of maſtering them, and do not confound *Difficulties* with *Impoſſibilities*; for the force of the underſtanding, in a conſtant, ſteady, and regular Application, is greater than itſelf thinks.

10. The art of reaſoning conſiſts in having *clear and diſtinct Ideas* of the *Things* conſidered, and examining every queſtion or argument till you find the *preciſe Point* on which it turns, and by which you are to determine with reſpect to it; this will ſave much unneceſſary labour.

11. *Thought*

11. *Thought* is the *Action* of the *Mind*, and inſeparable from it, ſo that it muſt have vain and idle thoughts, if it is not repleniſhed with ſuch as are uſeful and important; the former grow ſpontaneouſly, the latter require culture.

II. The province of the IMAGINATION or FANCY being to bring objects nearer to the mind by proper images or repreſentations of them, the ſtrength of the *Paſſions* and their government depend in a particular manner upon it, and it is to be corrected and regulated,

1. By preventing undue aſſociations of moral and *amiable* qualities with *vicious* habits and purſuits, ſo as to leſſen their natural deformity.

2. By preventing ſuch ſtrong impreſſions from *preſent* objects, as may hinder our attention to ſuch as are *abſent* or remote; but a *ſterility* of imagination is incurable, though not inconſiſtent with ſoundneſs of underſtanding.

III. The office of CONSCIENCE being to judge of the *Morality* of actions, as *right* or *wrong*, it muſt be properly informed, and its authority maintained; hence it was called, by the ancient moraliſts, τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν, or the authoritative principle.—Its *firſt* dictates

tates or ſuggeſtions are always the moſt uncorrupted, ſo far as it is informed.

IV. MEMORY is but little concerned in the morality of actions; it is improved by contemplation, attention, reflection, repetition, order, and method; but ſtill more by whatever annexes the ideas of *Pleaſure* and *Pain* to its objects. A ſoldier never forgets his wounds nor his victories. The art of *forgetting* is, however, ſometimes of as great moral importance, and as neceſſary to happineſs, as that of *remembering*, and may be underſtood from what was ſaid of the latter, as being the reverſe of it. Memory and imagination depend much on the bodily temperament.

V. The propenſities of INSTINCT, and ſolicitations of APPETITE, do generally require being reſtrained rather than increaſed or provoked;—and that command of them which is neceſſary to happineſs, requires that this reſtraint be ſoon begun, and habitually practiſed;—and that the incentives to them be avoided.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

REGULATION OF THE MORAL POWERS, viz.

THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE HEART AND WILL, THE AFFECTIONS AND PASSIONS.

THE office of the WILL being to prefer and reject, according as objects appear good or evil, the proper management of it lies in regulating its choice by the dictates of *Reaſon* and *Conſcience* in what is *purſued*, and acquieſcence in the appointments of *Providence* as to what is *attained*.

The AFFECTIONS and PASSIONS proceed from the HEART (morally conſidered); and being ſo many different modifications of the WILL, in the choice and purſuit of good, it is neceſſary to conſider in general, 1. their nature; 2. their diviſion; 3. their end and effects; 4. their government.

I. As to their NATURE, the *Paſſions* are ſenſible commotions of our whole frame, both ſoul and body, which are felt upon the perception of an object according to ſome ſpecial properties belonging to it; and an object fit to excite them muſt be

ſuppoſed either rare and uncommon, good and agreeable, or evil and diſagreeable.

II. The DIVISION of the *Paſſions* is into pleaſing and painful, offenſive and defenſive, private and public, primary and ſecondary.

III. Their END and EFFECTS are as follow:—

1. They are not deſigned to guide us, in determining as to *Truth* and *Falſhood*, *Good* and *Evil*—This is the province of reaſon; and it is only the weakneſs of reaſon which in theſe caſes leads us to take ſhelter in paſſion, but which is increaſed by thus yielding its own natural province.

2. Every *Paſſion* confines us to one ſide of a queſtion, and fixes the Mind on that property of its object which raiſed it.

3. They *magnify* or *diminiſh* their objects. *Anger* makes the offence appear more heinous—*Fear* the danger more formidable—*Fear* and *Cowardice* turn mole-hills into mountains—*Courage* levels mountains into mole-hills—*Joy* ſhortens time—*Sorrow* makes it tedious.

4. They *awaken* the powers of the mind, and *rouſe* the animal ſpirits, to prevent what is hurtful, and procure what is uſeful, for the body.

5. When

5. When we have judged what is good or evil, they *quicken* us to purſue and avoid it more than calm reaſon would do.

6. They *fix* the natural ſpirits and the thoughts ſtrongly on the objects that excite them, by magnifying their importance.

7. They are ſuited to our condition in this life, as a *State of Trial*, by giving an opportunity of evidencing which of the two we will hearken to, and obey,—*Reaſon* or *Paſſion*.

8. The *painful Paſſions* (in a due degree) are ſuited to our preſent ſtate:—*Fear* keeps us watchful; *Anger* keeps us from inſults; *Shame* and *Sorrow* tend to make us renounce our follies, and ſeek relief from our weakneſſes and diſtreſſes. It is the extremes of all theſe that hurt us.

9. The *pleaſing Affections* of *Love*, *Hope*, and *Joy*, make our troubles more ſufferable, and our duties more eaſy and agreeable.

IV. The GOVERNMENT of the *Paſſions* in general conſiſts in having the *defenſive Paſſions* proportioned to our dangers; the *private Paſſions* proportioned to our wants; and the *public Affections* to the wants, dangers, and relations of others;—but more particularly that government of the paſſions neceſſary to our preſent and future happineſs conſiſts,

1. In preventing and ſubduing the *inordinate* ones.

2. In exciting the *uſeful* ones to a juſt degree upon proper occaſions.

3. In ſuppreſſing or withholding them from improper objects.

4. In *moderating* them when too high and impetuous.

5. In *balancing* them againſt one another, the painful and pleaſing, the ſelfiſh and public, &c.

6. In *reſtraining* the defenſive Paſſions, and *eradicating* the unnatural.

But, as the regulation of the paſſions is a ſubject of ſo much delicacy and importance, more particular rules and directions for it are ſubjoined.

Study to have the abſolute command of your *natural Appetites*.

Cheriſh an habitual *Benevolence* to mankind.

Let not your paſſions determine your *Opinions* of perſons or things.

Guard againſt the paſſions to which you are liable by your *Conſtitution*, *Temper*, *Age*, *Station*, *Outward Circumſtances*, *&c.*

Guard againſt their firſt *Motions*, and the *Incentives* to them, as company, occurrences, &c.

Indulge not the *painful* paſſions, leſt they grow into a habit or temper.

Encourage

Encourage the *kindly* ones in a due degree.

Form your judgment of perſons and things when you are calm, ſedate, and free from the influence of any paſſion.

Abate one paſſion by ſtirring up another, as the fear of *Man* by the fear of GOD.

To get the command of your *Paſſions*, you muſt have the command of your *Thoughts*, which, though not eaſy, is by practice attainable.

It will be of great conſequence to you, in the conduct of your affairs in life, to cultivate *an habitual ſuperiority of Reaſon* to *Paſſion*, and to have no *particular Humour* of your own to gratify, that ſo your mind may be always ſteady, compoſed, and maſter of itſelf.

Enlarge your acquaintance with perſons and things, and confine your *Admiration* to objects worthy of it.

Accuſtom yourſelf to diſtinguiſh accurately between *Truth* and *Error*, *Good* and *Evil*, and guard againſt the prejudices of education, company, &c. yourſelf making allowance for thoſe of others.

Call yourſelf to account for every unruly fit of paſſion, how it diſcompoſes your ſpirit, diſturbs your quiet, ruffles your temper, breaks your peace, indiſpoſes for duty, and unfits for death.

CHAP. VI.

OF THE ABUSE OF THE FACULTIES AND PASSIONS.

THEIR USES and various offices appear from the Deſcriptions already given of them; their ABUSE therefore conſiſts more generally, in being debaſed to *Objects* unworthy of them, or employed for *Ends* contrary to thoſe for which they were given us. Thus it is an *Abuſe* of *Reaſon* and *Underſtanding*, to employ them, not in the diſcovery of *Truth*, but in the propagation of *Error*; not in directing us to what is *Right*, but confirming or juſtifying us in what is *Wrong*; not in *informing* others, but *miſleading* them: It is an *Abuſe* and debaſement of theſe *ſuperior* faculties to make them only ſubſervient to the *inferior*, or employ them chiefly in procuring the gratifications of ſenſe and appetite, enjoyments which we have in common with the brutes; but it is a corruption of them ſtill greater to employ them in promoting ſuch ends, and gratifying ſuch paſſions, as are *criminal* or guilty; the beſt laid ſchemes for theſe purpoſes, and greateſt ſagacity in contriving means for accompliſhing them, are the groſſeſt corruptions of the moſt diſtinguiſhing bleſſings of heaven.

The

The *Imagination* is *abuſed* and miſimproved, when employed chiefly in making falſe aſſociations of ideas not connected by nature, and giving falſe repreſentations of vice, for engaging us to the purſuit of it; alſo, when employed more about what is preſent than about what is future and of higher importance, more in adminiſtering to ſenſe, appetite, and paſſion, than in correcting them.

The *Will* is abuſed, when enſlaved by theſe inferior principles, in every choice it makes; and all the other faculties mentioned, ſuch as *Invention*, *Memory*, *Reflection*, *Wit*, *Genius*, &c. are *abuſed* and perverted, when (inſtead of being employed in improving ourſelves or others, in the way moſt conducive to preſent or future happineſs) they either lie uncultivated, or are made ſubſervient to the purpoſes of *Vice*, *Vanity*, and *Folly*; nay, the very *Senſes* and *Appetites* themſelves may be *abuſed* by ſuch an immoderate and injudicious gratification of them as impairs their reliſh and exerciſe. But one great ſource of all theſe abuſes, and which therefore requires the being more particularly pointed out, is the abuſe of the *Paſſions*; by which, though in themſelves uſeful, they become miſchievous and hurtful. In what caſes this takes place, both as to the *Paſſions* in *general*,

ral, and ſome of them in *particular*, may be ſeen from the following obſervations:

1. It is an *Abuſe* of our *Paſſions*, not ſo uncommon as it is enormous and impious, to indulge and juſtify them ſo far in ourſelves, as to aſcribe them to GOD, by imagining his goodneſs to be a kind of ſoftneſs and tenderneſs, his juſtice a rigour and ſeverity, his diſpleaſure a tranſport of anger, and that he is always pleaſed or offended when we are ſo, and manifeſts it in the ſame manner; this is making the *infinitely perfect* BEING like ourſelves, intereſting him even in our unjuſtifiable animoſities, (as the Heathens did their local Deities) and bringing in his authority to give a ſanction to our corruptions.

2. It is another great *Abuſe* of our *Paſſions*, when they are cool and languid in matters of great importance as to duty or intereſt, and yet warmly engaged about ſuch as are trivial or temporary, about many unhappy diſputes by which different ſects and parties are diſtinguiſhed.

3. It is alſo an *Abuſe* of the *Paſſions*, or rather giving them a place which is not due to them, when the whole, or greateſt part of religion is placed in animal emotions, or in thoſe fervors of affection, which, though highly commendable when well founded, ought not to be put in the place

of

of knowledge, judgment, and an uniform ſpring of faith and holineſs.

4. From this ariſes one *Abuſe* more of the *Paſſions* in general, and that is, when they are addreſſed or practiſed upon by popular orators or declaimers, not in religious matters only, but likewiſe in civil and political, without firſt informing the judgment; this is making the paſſions judges of truth, or guides to it, an office which does not belong to them.

Beſides the *Corruptions* or miſapplications of the *Paſſions* in *general*, there are various *Abuſes* of ſome of them in *particular*, which deſerve to be taken notice of, and which may be mentioned in the order in which thoſe paſſions, whoſe abuſe is moſt remarkable, are above delineated.

1. To begin, therefore, with *Approbation* and *Diſapprobation*, the firſt and ſimpleſt of all affections, and but very little removed from mere perceptions. They are *abuſed*, not only when miſplaced, from an error in judgment, or withheld where due, but likewiſe when ſo injudicious and immoderate, that, without attending to the mixture of good and bad qualities in their ſeveral objects, the one is carried to *Admiration*, and the other iſſues in *Contempt*: *Admiration* oftentimes confounds the *Marvelous* with the *Miraculous*, and *Contempt* miſtakes *Mediocrity* for *Meanneſs*.

2. CURIOSITY

2. CURIOSITY is a powerful incentive to ſtudy and application; but it is abuſed, both by deſcending too low, and by ſoaring too high.

3. HUMILITY is commendable, and PRIDE culpable, according as they ariſe from a true or falſe eſtimate of our own merit and abilities. The latter is one of the moſt univerſal paſſions; but ſo much an enemy to happineſs and virtue, that it is generally underſtood in a bad ſenſe: To reſtrain it, conſider in what reſpect your *Original* and *End* are like thoſe of others; that your preſent vain *Diſtinctions* will not follow you; that your fancied advantages above others are not of your own procuring; and what are they? If riches, beauty, youth, ſtrength, fame, are they not all periſhing and changeable, and often given to the worſt of men? Your birth you have from your anceſtors; your knowledge is ſhallow, if it puffs you up: When the thoughts of any excellencies do this, think on your *frailties* and *follies*; conſider that *Pride* lays a foundation for much uneaſineſs, many affronts, &c. and that it has been the occaſion of much miſchief in all ages.

4. It is an *abuſe* of our *Love* and *Eſteem* to carry them ſo far as blindly to adopt the opinions, approve the practices, and imitate the weakneſſes, of thoſe on whom we place

place them, without any diſtinction of what in them deſerves ſuch a degree of regard, and what does not. *Hatred* and *Diſeſteem* are liable to the ſame *Abuſes*, when no ſuch diſtinction is made, and likewiſe when hatred of *principles* or *practices* ariſes to hatred of the *perſons* of others, when every difference of *opinion* creates difference of *affection*, and *hatred* riſes to *inhumanity* and *cruelty*.

5. ANGER is lawful ſo far as neceſſary for repelling injuries, and ſecuring againſt them; but not when it goes farther—when it grows habitual—ſilences reaſon—miſtakes harm for injury, and refuſes to be undeceived or reconciled.

6. *Zeal*, though in ſome ſenſe a modification of love, yet, when indulged in an iraſcible Temper, and not regulated by reaſon and benevolence, it has the ſame effects with anger; and this *abuſe* of it is ſo common, that it is often underſtood in a bad ſenſe, as if void of reſtraint, and not ſupported by knowledge and judgment. *Zeal* extends to parties and opinions of every kind, as well as thoſe of a religious nature; and the ſame may be ſaid of *Enthuſiaſm*; for as it is very commonly uſed to expreſs any impulſe or fervor not ſufficiently warranted by reaſon, or overpowering it, be the ſubject and occaſion what they will, it may be ſaid there is a *poetical* and

and *political enthuſiaſm*, as well as a *religious* one, though the laſt be moſt noticeable, as being, in reſpect of its ſubject, moſt nearly allied to thoſe ſupernatural aids or influences which it lays claim to.

7. What was ſaid of *Zeal* and *Enthuſiaſm*, as being applicable to *other ſubjects* as well as *Religion*, may alſo be ſaid of *Bigotry*, or narrowneſs of ſpirit; it has reſpect to parties, factions, or opinions, of any kind, by which the benevolent affections are contracted, and which even national and ſocial attachments will not juſtify; ſo that *Patriotiſm* itſelf, *natural Affection*, and *Friendſhip*, amiable as they are in their proper meaning and extent, may yet be ſaid to be *abuſed*, when they ſuppreſs the benevolent regard due to other nations, families, and ſocieties.

8. The Chriſtian revelation does not (as infidels alledge) exclude *Friendſhip*, but enlarges, exemplifies, and exalts it. *Charity*, in Scripture, expreſſes *univerſal Good-will* and *Benevolence*, which is of all our affections the leaſt liable to be *abuſed*; though indeed *Compaſſion* may, if not conformable to juſtice; and *Complacence*, if beſtowed where only *Benevolence* is due.

9. *Charity*, in common language, ſuppoſes *indigence* of the object; *Liberality* does not. *Generoſity* is often uſed for *Liberality*, but we have taken it in a larger ſenſe.

ſenſe.—Though increaſing the *outward property* of others may diminiſh our own, yet as to true happineſs it is otherwiſe; ſo that SELF-LOVE is *abuſed* when it counteracts *Benevolence*, and *Emulation* when it degenerates into *Envy*; *Deſire*, when its object is not *attainable*, and *Averſion* when it is not *avoidable*. By a proper mixture of hope and fear, the balance of the mind is maintained; but when this is wanting, the former riſes to preſumption, and the latter ſinks into deſpair. For creatures ſurrounded with dangers, *Fear* is neceſſary; but it often needs to be abated, where outward dangers are the objects of it: in order to this, make ſure your intereſt in the divine favour and protection; put not too great a value on this life and its advantages; let your treaſure be in heaven; fear nothing but guilt; think on former fears that were groundleſs; and what muſt be encountered, endeavour to be prepared for, ſuppoſing it to be the worſt.—*Modeſty abuſed* degenerates into Timidity, *Mirth* into Levity, *Ridicule* often leads to Reproach, and *Gaiety* to Diſſipation.

JOY *abuſes* when it intoxicates, and SORROW when it clouds and preys upon the ſoul; but when they are properly mixed and moderated, they become means of forming the temper to virtue and happineſs.—It was fit that creatures liable to

Sin, and its effects, ſhould be liable to *Sorrow*, for alarming and reclaiming them; but it may ariſe from other cauſes not juſtifiable, and exceed the due degree: Its exceſſes are moderated or prevented, by moderating *hope* and *deſire*, by contemplating the divine government, and believing it *all-wiſe* and *good*; what is moſt for your *good* may poſſibly be what you *lament*, tho' you thereby bring on yourſelf a real *evil* for the time; compare your *miſeries* with your *ſins*, or with the *afflictions* of others, and conſider that *Death* will ſoon put a period to them, and that *Heaven* can amply compenſate them.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

MOTIVES AND CAUTIONS RESPECTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PASSIONS.

MOTIVES.

THOUGH the *Paſſions* are ſo called becauſe of the mind's being in ſome meaſure *paſſive* while under their influence and prevalence, yet it would be a diſcouragement to moral diſcipline, to ſuppoſe (with Lord Bacon, Kaimes, &c.) that it is intirely ſo; the noted inſtance of Socrates, and many others, nay, every man's experience of his abilities for ſelf-government, when he has ſome favourite ends in view, will prove the contrary.—The mind is indeed more paſſive the longer it continues under ſuch influence, ſo that the ſtruggle with paſſion may be hard if it has long reigned without controul; but the chief difficulty lies in firſt attempting it: for engaging, therefore, to begin and maintain it, the following MOTIVES are ſuggeſted:

1. Much leſs pains than are neceſſary to *gratify* any wrong paſſion, would often be ſufficient to *conquer* it.

2. Every new victory makes the conflict eaſier: it cannot laſt long; and when any ground is gained, it were ſhameful to retreat.

3. If your paſſions are not under command, it is hard to ſay how far they may carry you.

4. There is no *Pleaſure* more refined and laſting than what ariſes from the conſciouſneſs of having ſubdued any wrong paſſion, or denied it any undue and criminal gratification.

5. Such gratification, however *pleaſing* in the time, can never compenſate the inward *Remorſe* and other ruinous conſequences that follow it: So that

6. No man ever did a deſigned injury to another, without doing thereby a greater to himſelf.

CAUTIONS.

1. Beware of miſtaking *Natural Diſpoſitions* for *Virtuous Affections*, though they lay a foundation for their culture, and make the neglect of them more inexcuſable when counteracted: thus *Good-Nature* lays a foundation for *Benevolence*, natural *Courage* for the virtue of *Fortitude*, *Sagacity* for *Prudence*, &c.

2. Beware of miſtaking the *Change* of paſſions for the *Conqueſt* of them; as when the paſſions of *Youth* are exchanged for thoſe

those of *Age*, the passions of *Poverty* for those of affluence and *Plenty*, &c.

3. Beware of *sporting* with your own *Passions*, or those of others, by raising them wantonly, alternately, or abruptly.

4. Beware of *Action* while *Passion* has the mastery.

5. Beware of *Suspence* when *Resolution* is necessary, and of diffidence where action; there are cases where doubt or deliberation is dishonesty, and where the first thought is best.

6. Beware of your *ruling passion*, which may be known by its being most the subject of your thoughts, designs, delight, &c. and by intruding unseasonably, though sometimes it may yield to the occasional transports of another passion.

7. Beware of passions in disguise, from a confusion of names and ideas: thus *Avarice* would be taken for *Frugality*, the profusion of *Vanity* and *Ambition* for *Generosity*, excessive *Sorrow* for *Affection* to a friend, *Pride* or *Anger* for greatness of *Spirit*, and passionate *Resentment* for a sense of Honour. *Hatred* sometimes operates under the mask of *Love*, as in the case of persecution.

8. Think not the conquest of any *one passion* enough: *Self-government* (though thus facilitated) must be *complete* before it can be *comfortable*.

CHAP. VIII.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE MENTAL SYSTEM, WITH REMARKABLE CHARACTERS AND PROPERTIES OF THE AFFECTIONS AND PASSIONS.

THOUGH, for the clearer conception and deſcription of the *Mental Powers*, it be neceſſary to examine them ſeparately and analytically, yet care muſt be taken that they are not looked upon as ſo many *diſtinct Agents* in the mind, which is always to be conſidered as one ſimple indiviſible principle, operating or exerting itſelf in all theſe different ways. It ſeems to be for want of attention to this, that ſome diſputes have ariſen among Moraliſts (whom, of all men, they are the moſt unbecoming) about the freedom of the *Will* when determined by the judgment of the *Underſtanding*; alſo, whether it is by *Reaſon*, *Conſcience*, or a *Moral Senſe*, that moral qualities are perceived; and the like queſtions; for which ſee the ineſtimable writings of Mr. Locke, Butler, Hucheſon, Price, &c. What deſerves our attention more in this caſe, is, that,

1. As

1. As from the contemplation of man's bodily ſtructure, there are ſo many proofs of the wiſdom and goodneſs of our adorable CREATOR, we have ſtill more from an attentive view of this *moral Anatomy* of the human Mind. Thus we ſee principles of action, ſeemingly oppoſite, placed ſo as to balance one another, like the antagoniſt muſcles of the body, either of which ſeparately would occaſion diſtortion, yet jointly form an admirable ſyſtem or compoſition, but ſuch as muſt be owned to bear the marks of depravity and departure from its original ſtate; and if even the ruins of this be ſo admirable, what may we ſuppoſe it to have been in all its primæval innocence and excellence, though ſtill ſhort of that to which we may expect, by the divine goodneſs, it ſhall be advanced through the revolving periods of immortality. To prevent, however, any preſumptuous hope of being thus advanced indiſcriminately, and to animate our ambition and endeavours after it, amidſt the tumults of Paſſion, the allurements of Senſe, and the ſtimulations of Appetite, which we may at different times be obliged to encounter, it will be always neceſſary to remember, that this life is a field of combat, betwixt *Reaſon* and *Paſſion*, as it is betwixt *Faith* and *Senſe*, betwixt the brutal and angelical parts of our nature; that by ſuch an oppoſition of principles

principles within us, our obedience and virtue are put to the trial, and that the conſequences ſhall be accordingly immortal honour or diſgrace.

2. Another evidence of divine wiſdom in the moral fabric, ſimilar to that in the natural, is, that as in our outward ſtructure, though there be an uniformity or reſemblance in the eſſential parts or organs neceſſary to life, yet there is a variety or difference of voice and features neceſſary to diſtinguiſh one from another; even ſo, as to the inward conſtitution, though there be an uniformity in reſpect of thoſe paſſions and diſpoſitions neceſſary for the preſervation and defence of the whole, or individuals, as love of children, country, reputation, &c. yet there is a variety leading to different objects, ſtudies, and purſuits, where the general good requires it, as in the purſuits of knowledge, fame, power, &c. and the difference of characters as to ſoftneſs and ſeverity, action and contemplation, &c.

3. Where the PASSIONS are naturally *ſtrong* and impetuous, there is originally a proportionable ſtrength or vigour of *Reaſon* to check and controul them, if properly exerciſed and improved for this purpoſe; but, if otherwiſe, the ſtrength of Reaſon will diminiſh, while that of Paſſion increaſes, as Inſtinct co-operates with it: hence

hence it is that we often ſee *Love of Life and of Riches* grow ſtronger with years, when they ought in reaſon to grow weaker, if proper culture and diſcipline had been uſed. This is one of the many evidences that *Weakneſs* of *Paſſion* does not always argue or ariſe from Weakneſs of Mind, but the contrary.

4. The PASSIONS are CONTAGIOUS; we are ready to give way to them when we ſee others do ſo, or when we have lively repreſentations made to us of whatever gave an acute perception to others. Hence it is that poets and orators diſplay the deſigns, hopes, views, and attachments, of thoſe in whoſe favour they would wiſh to intereſt us, as in the ſtories of Pallas and Camilla, Niſus and Euryalus; but any repreſentations, either in the epic or dramatic way, are blameable, that tend to raiſe affections and paſſions which ought to be ſuppreſſed, as diſtruſt of Providence, or approbation of vice, by repreſenting it as moſt commonly ſucceſsful, varniſhing it over with falſe colours to deceive the imagination, or blending it injudiciouſly with many engaging qualities in the ſame character.

5. PASSIONS depend much upon *Opinions:* thus the opinion of another's power and inclination to hurt us raiſes our Anger; that of another's undeſerved miſery, our Pity,

Pity, &c. They alſo depend upon the aſſociations of ideas by the Fancy, and happineſs is influenced accordingly; ſo that there is no knowing a man's happineſs or unhappineſs, unleſs we knew his opinions, aſſociations, and paſſions thereupon.

6. The PASSIONS, when immoderate, *counteract* and diſappoint themſelves: thus the rage of the choleric man makes him unguarded and impotent; the ardour of the lover makes him more aukward and ungraceful; the timidity of the coward magnifies the danger, and makes him leſs able to avoid it; the inſatiableneſs of the covetous man mars his credit; and the profuſion of the vain and ambitious often leaves him in poverty and ignominy, the evils moſt dreaded by him.

7. The PASSIONS JUSTIFY themſelves, as may be obſerved where Fear, Anger, Love, Ambition, &c. prevail: however unreaſonable we think the paſſions of others, we are apt to think our own juſtifiable while we are under their influence, until, by Reaſon's reſuming its authority, we come to view them through the ſame temperate medium that we do thoſe of others.

8. The PASSIONS are not to be raiſed or ſuppreſſed by a *direct* or poſitive act of the *Will*, but in an *indirect* manner, by getting our attention turned to the *Qualities* or

or *Properties* of any object that tends either to excite or abate them: hence it is that the ſame object often excites love or hatred, deſire or averſion, in the ſame or different perſons, according to the views taken of it, and apprehenſions of its real or imaginary qualities.

Sorrow has been often prevented or moderated, in this indirect manner, by whatever employs the time or thoughts otherwiſe, and by ſuch conſiderations as excite *Hope* or *Fear*,—*Fear*, by conſideration of character, ſafety, and neceſſity, diverting it to another object, and thus making it *counteract* itſelf,—as alſo by whatever exerciſes *Hope* or *Anger*; and there is no paſſion whatſoever but may be prevented, excited, or moderated, by ſuch conſiderations as diminiſh or magnify the importance of the objects, and by gaining time to vary their direction, as *Cæſar* did by ſmothering his anger till he had counted the Roman alphabet. The government of the *tongue*, and guarding the avenues of *ſenſe*, will alſo be found a great ſtep towards the government of the paſſions, to which the power of *moderating* them is more neceſſary than the art of *raiſing* them. It is the ſelfiſh paſſions, not the ſocial, that need moſt reſtraint.

9. We cannot determine how far any paſſion may influence a man's conduct, from

from knowing the *Degree* of it, unleſs we alſo know what *Proportion* it bears to his judgment or experience, and to the other principles or paſſions that influence him. There is no man but has all of them in ſome degree, but they are naturally ſtronger in ſome and weaker in others, and differ in the ſame perſon in different ages and circumſtances; ſo that it is this proportion which determines how far any one of them, as *Compaſſion*, *Benevolence*, *Devotion*, &c. is in a due degree, by being ſuperior to malevolent or ſelfiſh principles which balance them.

10. There is no paſſion that ſways *Individuals*, to which *Nations* and *Communities* are not ſubject, if the means of propagating or diffuſing them become general; from hence proceed the different *Characters* and tempers which have been aſcribed to different *Nations*, to which the natural cauſes of climate, diet, air, &c. as well as the moral ones of education, laws, religion, &c. may have contributed.

10. *Appetites* and *Antipathies* have no regard to *Good* or *Evil* in their objects; but the *Paſſions* have, and their effects are to magnify their good and evil, and thereby quicken our other powers in the purſuit of them.—Love is, by way of eminence, ſometimes called *Affection*; and Anger, *Paſſion*.

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SYSTEMATICAL VIEW OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE:

COMPREHENDING

MEMORY, REASON, IMAGINATION.

I. From MEMORY proceeds

SACRED (or the History of Prophecies), ECCLESIASTICAL, CIVIL, ANCIENT, MODERN, and NATURAL HISTORY.

1. *Sacred* and *Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory* relates to Divine Revelation, Religious Duties, and Church Inſtitutions, &c.

2. *Civil*, *Ancient*, and *Modern Hiſtory*, comprizing political and literary hiſtory, conſiſts of

Memoirs, Antiquities, and Complete Hiſtory.

3. *Natural Hiſtory* relates to

Uniformity of Nature, as well in regard to the Heavens, as to

Meteors, Earth and Sea, Minerals, Vegetables, Animals, and the Elements.

Natural Hiſtory relates alſo to

Aberration of Nature in Celeſtial Prodigies, ſtrange Meteors, Prodigies on the Earth and Sea, monſtrous Minerals, monſtrous Vegetables, monſtrous Animals, and Prodigies in the Elements.

Likewiſe *Natural Hiſtory* comprehends

The application of Nature in Arts, Trade, and Manufactures;—in the working and application of Gold and Silver by Aſſayers, Coiners, Gold-Beaters, Gold-Wire-Dawers, Goldſmiths, Refiners, &c. &c.—in the managing of Precious Stones by Lapidaries, Diamond-Cutters, Jewellers, &c. &c.—in working of Iron and Copper by Forging, Foundery, Anchor-Smithery, Armoury, &c. &c.—in making and working Glaſs by Glaſs-Blowers, Looking-glaſs-Makers, Spectacle-Makers, &c. &c.—in curing and working Skins by Tanners, Curriers, Shamoiſers, Glovers, &c. &c.—in working in Stone and Plaiſter, &c. in Architecture, Sculpture, Maſonry, &c. &c.—in manufacturing Silk by Spinning, Throwing, Weaving, as of Velvet, &c. &c.—in manufacturing Wool, in Cloths, Hoſiery, &c. &c.

II. REASON

Is the Origin of PHILOSOPHY,

which comprehends

General METAPHYSICS or Ontology, the SCIENCE of GOD, the SCIENCE of MAN, and the SCIENCE of NATURE.

1. *Metaphyſics*, on which all the Sciences have their dependance.

2. The *Science of God* comprehends Natural Theology, Revealed Theology, the Science of Spirits, all which produce Religion.

3. The *Science of Man* comprehends Pneumatology, or the Science of the Soul: —with the Art of Thinking, whence proceed Apprehenſion, or the Science of Ideas; Judgment, or the Science of Propoſitions; Reaſoning, or Induction; and Method, from which ariſes Demonſtration, with Analyſis and Syntheſis.

The Science of Man comprehends alſo Logic, with the Art of Retention: whence ariſes Memory, both Natural and Artificial, together with Helps to Memory, by Alphabet and Cypher, giving origin to

Writing, Printing, Reading, and Decyphering, comprehending Orthography. From Logic alſo iſſues the Art of Communication, by the Science of Inſtruments in Diſcourſe, viz. Grammar; whence reſult Signs in Geſture or Character, Proſody, Conſtruction, Syntax, Philology, and Criticiſm: alſo from the Art of Communication proceeds the Science of Qualities in Diſcourſe, by Rhetoric and Verſification.

Moreover, from the Science of Man iſſues Morality, general and particular: from the former proceeds the Science of Good and Evil in general; from the latter, ariſes the Science of Laws, or Juriſprudence, whether Natural, Œconomical, or Commercial, in general.

4. The *Science of Nature* comprehends Metaphyſics of Bodies,—their Impenetrability, Extenſion, Motion, Vacuum, &c. &c.

This Science comprehends alſo Mathematics: —1. Pure, whence iſſue Arithmetic, both Numerical and Algebraical, whether Elementary, or Infiniteſimal and Fluxionary; and alſo Pure Geometry, both Elementary, in regard to Fortification, Tactics, and Navigation, and Tranſiental, as to the Doctrine of Curves.—2. Mixed Mathematics, divided into Mechanics, whether

whether Statics, Hydroſtatics, or Hydraulics; into Geometrical Aſtronomy, from whence iſſues Coſmography (comprizing Uranography, Geography, and Hydrography), Chronology, and Gnomonics or art of Dialling. Mixed Mathematics are divided alſo into Optics, from whence ſpring proper Optics, Dioptrics or Perſpective, and Catoptrics; they are likewiſe divided into Acouſtics, Pneumatics, and the Doctrine of Chances.—3. Phyſico-Mathematics.

The Science of Nature alſo comprehends Particular Phyſics: whence iſſues Zoology, comprehending Anatomy, both ſimple and comparative; Phyſiology; Medicine, including Hygiena, Pathology, and Therapeutica (whence the regulation of Diet, Surgery, and Pharmacy); Farriery; Horſemanſhip; Hunting; Fiſhing; and Fowling. Particular Phyſics alſo include Phyſical Aſtronomy; Meteorology; Coſmology, branching into Uranology, Aerology, Geology, and Hydrology; Botany, including Agriculture and Gardening; Minerology; and Chemiſtry, comprehending Chemiſtry proper (whence Pyrotechny, Dying, &c.), Metallurgy, and Alchemy.

III. IMA-

III. IMAGINATION

is the ORIGIN of

1. POETRY, both SACRED and PROFANE;

branching into

Narrative, as in an Epic Poem, Madrigal, Epigram, Romance, &c. &c.

Dramatic, whether in Tragedy, Comedy, Opera, Paſtoral, &c. &c.

Parabolic, in Allegories.

2. MUSIC, either Theoretical, Practical, Vocal, or Inſtrumental.

3. PAINTING.

4. SCULPTURE.

5. CIVIL ARCHITECTURE.

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